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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellee adopts the Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
An Order issued by the trial court in the form of a Minute Entry on April 15, 2008, 
found Appellant Fay "had absolutely no legal or factual basis for involving Todd Rodgers 
in this action and asserting a claim against him." The trial court found that Fay had violated 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and held him liable for Mr. Rodgers' fees and 
costs incurred in defending Fay's claims. Based upon the October 7, 2008, Minute 
Entry/Order, the trial court entered Judgment against Fay in the amount of $6,301.10, interest 
accruing at 6.99% until paid. Appellant filed notice of appeal on November 5, 2008. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
See Statement of Issues, Infra. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"[T]he standard of review for evaluating the denial or imposition of Rule 11 sanctions 
involves a three-tiered approach: '(1) findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly 
erroneous standard; (2) legal conclusions are reviewed under the correction of error standard; 
and (3) the type and amount of sanctions to be imposed [are] reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard.'5' See Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86, {^16, 15 P.3d 1021 (Utah 
2000)(Morse v. Packer, 1999 UT 5, f 10, 973 P.2d 422 (citing Barnard v. Sutliff 846 P.2d 
1229, 1234 (Utah 1992))). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court properly sanctioned Fay for his failure to make an 
objectively reasonable inquiry before filing his Complaint, and his failure to dismiss the 
allegations despite what he learned thereafter. 
2. Whether the trial court properly found that Fay failed to make an objectively 
reasonable inquiry as to any connection between Rodgers' and Global Travel before filing 
his Complaint. 
3. Whether the trial court properly supported its legal conclusions with 
sufficiently specific findings of fact. 
4. Whether the law required the trial court to offset the sanctions awarded to Mr. 
Rodgers (his attorney's fees) under the mitigation-of-damages doctrine because Mr. Rodgers 
failed to file a dispositive motion earlier. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
On January 5, 2006, Appellant filed a Complaint for damages in the Third District 
Court, naming Global Travel Network, Todd Rodgers, and Does 1 through 10 as 
Defendants. R 1-12. On January 24, 2008, the trial court granted Rodgers' Motion and 
dismissed him from the law suit. R 401. 
On February 29, 2008, Mr. Rodgers filed a Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11. R 
402-13. Fay filed a Memorandum in Opposition on March 17, 2008. R 414-33. On 
March 28, 2008, Mr. Rodgers filed a Response, a Request for Oral Argument, and a 
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Request to Submit for Decision. R 434-48. In a Minute Entry dated April 15, 2008, the 
trial court granted Rodgers' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions . R 454-57. On October 7, 
2008, the trial court entered Judgment against Fay in the amount of $6,301.10, with 
interest at 6.99 percent until paid. R 535-36. Appellant Fay filed notice of appeal on 
November 5, 2008. R 537-38. 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
Fay claims that he contacted the Utah Attorney General's Office after receiving 
two fraudulent telephone solicitations in late November 2004. (R 3, 427). Appellant 
contacted the Defendants in December of 2004. (R 5). 
Appellant asserts that the state investigator told him that Todd Rodgers was the 
contact person for Global Travel Network and was representing Global in the state 
investigation. According to Appellant, he was told to deal directly with Rodgers. (R 
427).l 
In paragraph five of his Affidavit, filed on March 4, 2008, Fay also claims that, 
"At that time and at all subsequent times, I understood that Rodgers was 'Global' or the 
person with total authority to represent Global in all its dealings with me, and the state 
investigators." (R 427). Paragraph seven of Fay's Affidavit alleges that Rodgers signed 
all communications from Global to him (R 427), and paragraph nine, that Rodgers signed 
a settlement agreement. (R 428). 
1
 Rodgers notes there is no non-hearsay support for this self-serving assertion in the record. Appellant identified a 
record from the Attorney General's Office he apparently intended to introduce as an exhibit. The record shows the 
exhibit was not received. (R 450). 
3 
On February 22, 2005, Mr. Rodgers" counsel sent a letter to Fay expressing 
concern over the allegations of intentional representation and fraud made against 
Maddox's client, Global Travel Network, and requesting the facts supporting those 
allegations. (R 509-510.) 
On February 24,2005, Rodgers sent a letter to Fay on Global Travel Network 
letterhead. The signature block lists Todd Rodgers as the Western District Manager. (R 
511.) 
In June of 2005, "Global Travel Network, [Global] and John F. Fay [FAY]," 
signed a settlement agreement. (R 41.) This agreement states that "Rodgers affirms he 
has authority to bind Global in this agreement." Rodgers signed it "for GLOBAL 
TRAVEL NETWORK." (R 42.) The parties identified in the agreement are Global 
Travel Network and John F. Fay. All of the actions to be taken in the Settlement 
Agreement are to be taken by either Global or Fay. Global is either to provide funds to 
Fay or to reimburse him upon receiving proof of expenditures. Fay is bound to provide 
such proof. The agreement does not require Rodgers to do anything. Rodgers5 
participation does not go beyond signing the agreement. 
Rodgers is not a party to the agreement. It is Global Travel Network that is acting 
through Rodgers, not Rodgers acting through Global Travel Network. The Agreement 
also states, "In consideration for the above benefits, FAY will not prosecute a civil 
lawsuit against Global." Rodgers is not mentioned at all, as potentially liable or as a 
potential defendant. (R42.) 
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Appellant Fay (R 1-10) filed his Complaint in the trial court on January 5, 2006. 
In paragraph three of his Complaint, Appellant, an active member of the Utah State Bar, 
states, "Plaintiff believes Defendant Rogers [sic] is a principle of Defendant Global." (R 
2.) Fay made this assertion despite his acknowledgement, in paragraph two of his 
Complaint, that he was ignorant as to the organizational structure of Global. (R 1.) He 
knew how to contact Global, as is evident in paragraph 16 of his Complaint. (R 5.) He 
knew Mr. Rodgers was the Western District Manager of Global. (R 511.) 
On January 28, 2006, Scott Nichols, President of Global Travel Network, sent 
Appellant a letter on company letterhead regarding the possible settlement of the matter. 
The letterhead lists Global's address in Murray, Utah. Among other things, the letter 
states, 
Since Mr. Rodgers does not have signatory privileges on the corporate bank 
account, and in order to prevent any future delays, for demands of payment 
on your part, I prefer to prepay the balance of your anticipated charges 
previously identified. I expect that this will put this matter to rest. If you 
find this satisfactory, cash the enclosed check, enjoy your vacation, and we 
will both agree that all your disputes with Global Travel Network are 
completely resolved. If you do not find this agreeable, please direct all 
future correspondence to me personally. 
(R 58.) This letter, and the attached check in the amount of $3,640.82, dated January 28, 
2006, were from Mr. Scott Nichols, not Mr. Rodgers. Fay even acknowledges this in 
paragraph four of his Plaintiffs List of Trial Witnesses and Exhibits : "Letter to John Fay 
from Scott Nichols (encloses check $3,640.82)." (R 357.) The letter and check (R 427) 
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show that someone other than Mr. Rodgers had signed a communication with Fay, 
contrary to his assertion that only Rodgers had signed communications with him. 
On September 6, 2007, Fay deposed Mr. Scott Nichols. In that deposition, Mr. 
Nichols stated that Global Travel Network is a dba of Speakers Consulting Inc., a 
Michigan corporation of which Mr. Nichols is a principal. Speakers Consulting, Inc., 
owns Global Travel Network. 
Mr. Rodgers was also deposed on September 6, 2007. He stated his job title with 
Global Travel Network as Western District Manager. Fay was informed of this in Mr. 
Rodgers' letter of February 24, 2005. (R 511.) Mr. Rodgers' had been a sales person, a 
manager, and general manager at Global. (R 334.) Fay took the September 6, 2007, 
deposition approximately 16 months prior to opposing Mr. Rodgers' motion to be 
dismissed from the case. 
In Appellant's Memorandum opposing Mr. Rodgers' Motion to Dismiss, Fay 
acknowledged that Global is a dba of a Michigan corporation; that Mr. Rodgers is an 
employee, not an officer; that all of Mr. Rodgers' actions on behalf of Global were 
performed as an employee; that Mr. Rodgers did not make the original telephone call, but 
only provided the script used by the telemarketers who did make the call. ( R371-2). As 
for Rodgers' assertion that the script requested those called to attend a 90-minute 
presentation, Fay does not dispute it. Rather, he says it "[m]ay be correct, but is 
ambiguous and unclear, irrelevant and lacking foundation." (R 372). Despite all of this 
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knowledge, Appellant remained obdurate in his opposition to Rodgers' being dismissed 
from the suit. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant's brief does not comply with the requirements of Rule 24 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Fay makes no attempt to marshal the evidence. Had he 
done so, he would have produced the facts set forth above. While he cites cases, he does 
so with little or no analysis applying the principles thereof to the facts he should have 
marshaled in this case. 
Appellant did not make an objectively reasonable inquiry before filing his 
Complaint against Rodgers. Had he done so, he would have known that Rodgers was an 
employee of a dba of a Michigan corporation— Speakers Consulting Inc.—and simply 
acting within the scope of his employment as the Western District Manager of Global. 
Although Fay failed to marshal the evidence (and did not, in fact, even attempt in 
good faith to do so), the evidence supports the trial court's finding "[T]hat there is 
absolutely no evidentiary support for the Plaintiffs claims that he understood Mr. 
Rodgers to be 'Global for all intents and purposes.'" (Minute Entry, FL 454-5). The trial 
court also found that "[M]r. Rodgers was not a party to the contract at issue in this case." 
(Minute Entry, R 455). That finding is consistent with the contract, which does not list 
Mr. Rodgers as a party. (R 42-2). 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Mr. Rodgers attorney fees. 
Had Fay made the objectively reasonable inquiry he was duty bound to make, Mr. 
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Rodgers would never have been named as a party defendant. Appellant was well aware 
that Mr. Rodgers was not a party to the contract, but was merely acting on behalf of 
Global 
At numerous points along the way, Fay ought to have recognized his error and 
dismissed his allegations against Mr. Rodgers. Instead, rather than withdraw his specious 
allegations, he compounds insult with injury by insisting on presenting them yet again in 
an appeal. This by itself justifies affirmation of the trial court's award of sanctions as 
well as assessing Mr. Rodgers' costs in defending himself from these spurious claims 
once again on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
1. APPELLANT'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO 
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
The duty to marshal evidence in support of a trial court's finding of fact appears in 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) as well as Utah case law: 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. 
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully 
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of 
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing 
this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out 
a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to 
convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the 
evidence is clearly erroneous. 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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Rather than constructing the mandated "magnificent array of supporting evidence," 
Fay, simply makes the self-serving, unsupported assertion "that any effort to marshal the 
evidence in support of such limited findings would be futile." (Appellant's Brief at page 
17, (quoting Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635 (Ut.App. 1995)). Fay then attempts to 
excuse his non-compliance by asserting that, "The trial court's findings are so incomplete, 
so conclusory, so lacking in requisite detail, that any effort to marshall [sic] the evidence 
in support of such limited findings would be futile." (Appellant's Brief, pg. 17). It is, 
however, for this Court to determine the sufficiency of the trial court's findings, not Fay. 
Moreover, an examination of the record reveals that Fay's summary dismissal of the 
marshaling mandate is presumptuous, and his assertion that the trial court's findings are 
insufficient, false. Had he marshaled the evidence, he would have found the facts fatal to 
his claims, from the filing of his Complaint to pursuing this appeal. 
Briefly, Fay filed a Complaint without bothering to ascertain the nature of Global. 
(Complaint, paragraph one (R 1).) Despite this ignorance, he asserts that Mr. Rodgers 
was a principal of Global, although he acknowledges not knowing the nature of Global. 
(Complaint, paragraph two (R 2).) Before filing the Complaint, Fay had received a letter 
from Mr. Rodgers on Global Travel Network letterhead in which the signature block 
declares Mr. Rodgers the Western District Manager of the company. (R 511). This title 
does not suggest that one is a company principal. Fay had signed a settlement agreement 
with Global—not Mr. Rodgers—that states that Mr. Rodgers had been authorized to bind 
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Global cin this agreement." Mr. Rodgers signed the settlement agreement uon behalf of 
Global Travel Network." (R 42). 
Appellant Fay, however, does not marshal these facts, nor does he point out how or 
why the trial court's legal conclusions based thereupon are in error. The only 
"marshaling" Fay has done is to repeat such evidence as he believes to support his 
position. This is not what is required: 
[Presenting evidence supporting the challenged conclusion does not satisfy 
the marshaling requirement. ... [All Fay] has done instead is "merely re-argue 
the factual case ... presented in the trial court," leaving [Mr. Rodgers] and this 
court to bear the expense and time of performing the critical task of marshaling 
the evidence. This is unfair, inefficient, and unacceptable. 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, 
126, 140 P.3d 1200 (quoting Chen v. Stewart 
Appellant cannot merely present evidence he believes supports his position. 
He is to marshal evidence supporting the trial court's decision. He did not do so. 
For this reason alone, Appellant Fay's Brief should be stricken and his appeal 
dismissed. 
2.(A) THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
The Utah Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that: 
[A] trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,935-36 (Utah 1994). In order to establish 
that a particular finding of fact is clearly erroneous, f,[a]n appellant must marshal 
the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
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evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the 
clear weight of the evidence." In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 
1989) (internal quotations omitted). If the evidence is inadequately marshaled, 
this court assumes that all findings are adequately supported by the evidence. In 
re Estate ofBeesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994). 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,1J19, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004). As recently 
noted by this Court, a finding is clearly erroneous if it is "'against the clear weight of 
the evidence' or lead[s] us to 'a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made,'" State v. Keener, 2008 UT App 288, f l l , 191 P.3d 835 (quoting State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
The trial court found Rodgers was an employee of Global Travel Network. It 
found Rodgers was involved in resolving Appellant's complaints with Global and 
signed a settlement agreement with Appellant on behalf of Global. The trial court 
ultimately found that, 
[TJhere is absolutely no evidentiary support for the Plaintiffs claims 
that he understood Mr. Rodgers to be 'Global for all intents and 
purposes.' Indeed, it is clear from the Plaintiffs opposition and his 
Affidavit that he understood throughout these proceedings that Mr. 
Rodgers was merely representing Global Travel Network. 
(Minute entry, pages one and two, emphasis added (R 454-456).) Not only are these 
findings not against the clear weight of the evidence, they are, instead, clearly upheld and 
supported by evidence Fay has completely ignored and left unmarshalled. 
Where, as here, a plaintiff admits that he does not know the nature of Global, 
(Complaint, paragraph one (R 1), an objectively reasonable inquiiy, particularly for a 
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member of the Utah Bar, would be to go to the Utah Department of Commerce website's 
index of business entities and look it up. It would have been a matter of only a few moments 
to complete such a search, disclosing GlobaPs type and place of business, its principals, and 
its registered agent. Notwithstanding the ease with which this information may be obtained, 
there is no evidence Fay took this simple step nor made any such inquiry. 
Fay had letters from GlobaPs attorney, David Maddox, as well as from Mr. Rodgers 
himself. Mr. Rodgers' letter was on Global Travel Network letterhead. Yet Fay produces no 
evidence that he had done even the most rudimentary investigation, therefore apparently 
never asked either Mr. Maddox or Mr. Rodgers what the nature of Global was, or what role 
or position Mr. Rodgers held. Again, based upon the lack of assertion to the contrary, it 
appears that Fay didn't bother to even ask Murray City (where GlobaPs main office is 
located) whether it had issued Global a business licence and if so, in what business capacity. 
Fay's whole inquiry into Mr. Rodgers' position at Global—belying Fay's status as an 
active member of the Utah State Bar—apparently consisted of nothing more than the 
uninformed assumption that he did not know the nature of Global, but, whatever it was, 
Rodgers was its principal. (Complaint at R 2 and 3.) This is not anything like "objectively 
reasonable inquiry"; this is not even subjectively reasonable inquiry. Fay made no inquiry 
at all beyond an apparent, "Who can I name as a defendant in the hope someone will be 
ordered to pay me?" 
The trial court found that Mr. Rodgers was an employee of Global, that he was involved 
in resolving certain issues between Global and Fay, and that he had signed a settlement 
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agreement uon behalf of Global Travel Network." (Minute Entry (R 454); see also R.42, the 
settlement agreement.) Mr. Rodgers signed the June 2005 agreement "for" Global, not "as" 
Global, the agreement itself declaring that Mr. Rodgers had authority to bind Global "in this 
agreement," not in all agreements or as a principal. This use of "for" and the phrase "in this 
agreement" does not support Fay's assertion that he understood Mr. Rodgers to be Global 
for all intents and purposes, and the trial court properly and specifically rejected Fay's 
assertions to the contrary. The trial court rightly determined that the reasonable inference to 
draw from the phrase was that Rodgers' authority, as an employee, was limited to signing 
that particular agreement. 
2(B) CORRESPONDENCE FROM RODGERS AND MR. MADDOX PUT FAY ON 
NOTICE AS TO RODGERS9 ROLE BEFORE FAY FILED HIS COMPLAINT, 
As already noted above, before filing his Complaint, Fay had been in possession of 
letters putting him on notice that Rodgers was not a principal, but an employee with limited 
authority. One such letter was from Mr. David Maddox (counsel for Rodgers and Global), 
dated February 22, 2005 (R 509-510), and another letter was from Rodgers himself, dated 
February 24,2005. (R 511). Both of these letters pre-date the filing of the complaint by Fay 
by several months. Fay actually refers to them both in his brief. (Appellant's Brief at X.) 
Mr. Maddox's letter informed Fay. "Mr. Rogers indicates to me that he is more than 
willing to provide you the trip that you were entitled to when you were called by this third 
party." This shows the alleged fraudulent statements were made by a third party. No basis 
is ever given as to why the Rodgers is liable for the statement. Appellant, unfortunately 
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(though unsurprisingly), does not marshal that statement, nor does he demonstrate that the 
trial court erroneously concluded it was consistent with Mr. Rodgers being an employee 
rather than a principal of Global. 
The signature block of Mr. Rodgers' letter—written on Global Travel Network 
letterhead—identifies him as the Global5s Western District Manager. It does not name him 
as President, Vice President, CEO, COO, Secretary/Treasurer, or any other title suggesting 
that Mr. Rodgers was more than an employee. Indeed, one could reasonably infer from the 
title "Western District Manager" that there is at least one other district with a manager over 
it. Appellant Fay's Trial Counsel drew the same inference, that Rodgers was an employee 
and that there could be several managers, as illustrated by the following line of questioning 
in his deposition of Mr. Rodgers: 
In response to a question relating to his position with Global, Mr. Rodgers said his job 
title was "District Manager. Western District Manager." The next question trial counsel for 
Fay was, " [sic] there more than one district [sic] of Global Travel Network?" (R 334). 
Again, however, Fay does not show why the multiple districts inferred by Fay's counsel 
during the deposition should not have been inferred by himself before filing his Complaint. 
Nor, again, does he show why the trial court erred when it relied on this evidence in support 
of its conclusion that Mr. Rodgers was an employee, not a principal. What is more, Fay does 
not show, in light of this evidence, that there was clear error on the trial court's part in its 
rejecting Fay's conclusion that Mr. Rodgers "[i]s Global for all intents and purposes." 
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Even without the signature block, though, the text of Mr. Rodgers* letter makes a very 
clear distinction between Rodgers personally and his employer, Global Travel Network. He 
uses uwe r when talking about Global's attitude or obligations, such as, "we will be happy 
. . .," or "we will absolutely confirm . . .'\ He then uses "I" when talking about what he 
would do personally, such as "I will personally assist you with these arrangements,...," or 
"I will be glad to assist you . . ."). The distinction is obvious. Todd Rodgers is not Global 
but rather he is its employee. Yet again, Fay does not analyze this evidence, nor show how 
the trial court misunderstood it.2 
2 (C) NICHOLS' LETTER MAKES RODGERS ROLE AS AN EMPLOYEE 
CLEAR. 
The Fay Complaint calls Global an entity with an unknown organizational structure. 
(R. 1) Thus, given his admitted ignorance of GlobaPs nature when he filed his Complaint, 
Fay could not possibly assert, in good faith, that Rodgers "is Global for all intents and 
purposes." Paragraph three of Appellant's Complaint also states, "Further, Plaintiff believes 
Defendant Rogers [sic] is a principal of Defendant Global." (R 2). As "principal" is 
commonly understood to be a person responsible for directing the actions of a corporation 
and its employees. 
2 
There is only one statement in Mr. Rodgers' letter that can be twisted, if taken out of context, to fit Fay's interpretation. 
Mr. Rodgers letter states, "In the event of legal pursuit I may take against unauthorized persons making alleged 
representations on behalf of my company . . ." Fay would have this Court read this language, "In the event of legal 
pursuit I may take..." as a claim to headship of Global Travel Network. However, he then states he would do so "on 
behalf of my company...". Given the numerous indicia of mere employee status and the use of the phrase "my company" 
as a reference to who he works for, this reading is untenable. Employees often refer to "my company" despite their 
having no control over it or its activities. It also makes sense that, if Mr. Rodgers' responsibilities included drafting the 
script for the telemarketers, it would also be within the scope of his employment to deal with deviation from that script 
in breach of the contract they had with Global. 
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Appellant Fay does not marshal these facts, nor indeed, hardly any others. Instead, Fay 
expects this Court to accept the notion that he had no idea what Global was, but that he was 
nevertheless justified in concluding that, whatever Global was, it was in fact Mr. Todd 
Rodgers, and that, despite the entire absence of any evidence whatsoever in support of this 
bizarre inference, the conclusion of the trial court to the contrary was somehow clearly 
erroneous. 
Fay's position is also inconsistent with what he had learned from the letter sent to him 
by Mr. Scott Nichols. (R 58.) Approximately three weeks after filing the Complaint, 
Appellant received a letter from Mr. Nichols. The letter clearly identified Nichols as the 
President of Global Travel Network. The letter also informed Fay that Mr. Rodgers did not 
have authority to sign on the corporate account, and it also informed Appellant that future 
communications should be directed to Scott Nichols, not Todd Rodgers. 
Several things are apparent here: Global is a corporation; Nichols is its President; it 
is Nichols, not Rodgers, with whom Fay was asked to deal; and Rodgers does not have 
signing authority. (Nichols letter, R 58.) Unlike corporate officers, who routinely have 
signing authority on accounts, Mr. Rodgers had no such signing authority on the account. 
Id. Mr. Rodgers authority was plainly limited to signing the June 2005 agreement, which 
fact is specifically stated in the agreement itself ("Rodgers affirms he has authority to 
bind Global in this agreement"). (Emphasis added). (R 42.) This letter was sent within 
weeks of the filing of the Complaint by Fay, yet he persists in including Rodgers as a 
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defendant for over 2 years and opposes the Motion for Summary Judgement filed 
approximately 23 months later! 
Notwithstanding this information, Fay continued his remorseless pursuit of Mr. 
Rodgers. Fay never amended his Complaint, in which he had said that he did not know 
the nature of Global, nor did he in any way demonstrate taking any reasonable steps to 
learn the nature of Global. He remained, instead, focused on his pursuit of Mr. Rodgers. 
Even after depositions reaffirmed that Mr. Rodgers was an employee rather than a 
principal (R 334), and that Global was a dba of a Michigan corporation (R 333), Fay 
continued his single-minded—albeit completely erroneous—pursuit of Todd Rodgers. 
Fay's Memorandum opposing the Motion to Dismiss acknowledges that Global is a 
dba of a Michigan corporation; that Mr. Rodgers is its employee, not one of its officers; 
that all of his actions on behalf of Global were undertaken as an employee; that Mr. 
Rodgers did not make the original telephone call, but only provided the script used by the 
telemarketers who did; and that the script stated persons were asked to attend a 90-minute 
presentation. (R 372, 414, and 420.) Despite this knowledge, Appellant Fay remained 
obstinately unwilling to agree to Rodgers' dismissal from the suit. This is exactly what 
the trial court referred to when it ruled that Fay understood throughout the proceedings 
that Rodgers was merely representing Global Travel Network. (R 455) 
Fay seeks to convince this Court that the trial court's authority to impose Rule 11 
sanctions is limited to what he knew, or should have known following an objectively 
reasonable inquiry, at the time he filed the Complaint. Paradoxically, though, Fay never 
17 
engaged in any objectively reasonable inquiry. Instead, he began his pursuit of Mr. 
Rodgers without having bothered to make reasonable inquiry of any sort, objective or 
otherwise. He then continued relentlessly pursuing Rodgers and pointedly ignoring what 
an objectively reasonable inquiry would have revealed once it was made clear to him by 
letters and responses to discovery, such as the deposition referenced previously. This 
makes it clear that not only that no amount of objectively reasonable inquiry prior to 
filing his Complaint would have dissuaded Appellant Fay from his course but that he 
would pursue the matter even after the facts he should have inquired about were presented 
to him on several occasions. These facts support the trial court's conclusion that Rodgers 
was not Global, and that Appellant knew it and chose to ignore it. 
The trial court also found no evidence to support Appellant Fay's claims that Mr. 
Rodgers breached a contract or engaged in fraud. (R 455.) As the court noted, and as is 
clear from the contract itself, Mr. Rodgers was not a party to the contract. The contract is 
between Global and Fay, the Appellant. Mr. Rodgers signed the contract for Global, not 
as Global. The contract plainly states that Mr. Rodgers had authority to sign the contract, 
nothing more. 
The trial court noted that Fay never alleged that Mr. Rodgers was the alter ego of 
Global, or that Rodgers had benefited in any way from the alleged misrepresentations of 
the telemarketers. The trial court said, "Simply put, the Plaintiff has never demonstrated 
a link between Mr. Rodgers and the fraud he alleged in the Complaint or even a 
reasonable belief that such a link existed." (R 455.) 
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Because Appellant has failed to satisfy the first prong of the test, his appeal must 
fail. This Court should therefore sustain the trial court's ruling, and dismiss the appeal. 
3. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE SUPPORTED BY THE 
FACTS. 
The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that because Fay "had absolutely no 
legal or factual basis for involving Mr. Rodgers in the action and asserting claims against 
him," that Fay had, "directly violated Rule 11 and that sanctions are warranted." (R 456.) 
The pertinent portion of Rule 11 is subsection (b): 
Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper 
to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney 
or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, 
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances .... 
The trial court found that Fay had not made a reasonable inquiry. As has been amply 
demonstrated in the previous arguments, (some of them by Fay in his own Brief), Fay 
ignored information he had before him prior to his filing a Complaint., and made no effort, 
what is more, to gather additional information to clarify the status of Rodgers before he 
filed his Complaint. Again, he thereafter ignored such information which came to his 
attention in letters and depositions which refuted his position after filing his Complaint to 
the point of opposing the dismissal of Rodgers immediately prior to trial and then filing 
his appeal on the same issues. 
Appellant Fay claims that the Attorney General's Office directed him to Mr. 
Rodgers. Fay did not, however, make any sort of independent inquiry after supposedly 
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being so directed. His self-serving assertion, which is hearsay, has no non-hearsay 
support in the record, his Affidavits and the exhibit he did not introduce 
Based on facts set forth previously, it is clear that the trial court correctly concluded 
Appellant violated Rule 11, not merely when he filed his Complaint, but throughout the 
proceedings and on into this very appeal. Mr. Rodgers submits that under the correction-
of-error standard, there is no error to correct. Fay has failed the second prong of the test. 
His appeal should be dismissed. 
4. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
DETERMINED THAT APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO MAKE AN 
OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE INQUIRY, AND HIS CONDUCT 
THROUGHOUT, CAUSED RODGERS TO INCUR ATTORNEY FEES. 
In addition to ignoring the abundant evidence throughout this matter that Mr. 
Rodgers has no place in Fay's dispute with Global, Fay asks this Court to find that no 
reasonable person could have concluded that his conduct caused Mr. Rodgers to incur 
attorney fees. As outlined above, however, Fay willfully failed to make an objectively 
reasonable inquiry before filing his Complaint. Because the Attorney General's Office 
allegedly referred him to Todd Rodgers, Fay leaped to the unfounded (and somewhat 
incoherent) conclusion that "Rodgers was Global." This he did (a) without accessing the 
data on the Utah Department of Commerce website, (b) without regard to correspondence 
naming Mr. Rodgers as Global's Western District Manager, (c) without inquiring of 
Murray City as to whether or not it had issued a business license to Global, and (d) 
without a lawyer's reading and understanding of the contract Rodgers signed for Global 
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which did not allocate any duty to Rodgers to do anything as part of the settlement. 
Based upon these omissions, Fay brought suit against Mr. Rodgers who, as a result, was 
required to hire an attorney to defend himself against spurious and specious allegations 
that should never have been filed. 
Appellant Fay compounded his error when, three weeks after filing his Complaint, 
he received a letter from President Scott Nichols, accompanied by a check. The letter 
identified Nichols as the President of Global, stated that Mr. Rodgers lacked authority to 
sign on the account, and enclosed a check apparently signed by Nichols {supra). This 
should have demonstrated to Fay that Mr. Rodgers simply was not a proper target in this 
dispute. Undaunted by facts, however, Fay ignored the corroborating information he 
acquired in deposing Rodgers and Nichols. Appellant ignored Mr. Rodgers' and Nichols' 
testimonies to the effect that Rodgers was an employee of Global, the Utah dba of a 
Michigan corporation. Still undeterred by these various facts (all and each of which he 
acknowledges knowing), Appellant Fay opposed dismissing Rodgers from the case. At 
this point, it should have been clear to Fay that he had no case againsi Rodgers except for 
what appears to be a personal vendetta. Irrationally, it was Fay who forced the hearing on 
the motion to dismiss Rodgers as a defendant by ignoring the facts before him and 
opposing the motion. 
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5. APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE 
OFFSET THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF 
AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
Appellant Fay argues that the doctrine of avoidable consequences or mitigation of 
damages should have been applied to the sanctions imposed by the trial court because Mr. 
Rodgers did not file a motion to dismiss under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b) (6) or 
a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12 (e). This, however, is something 
akin to asking for remittitur of a false imprisonment verdict because the victim could have 
kicked down the locked door and escaped, but chose not to. This argument fails for 
several reasons. 
Fay cites breach-of-contraet cases in support of his argument, ignoring the fact that 
the trial court determined sanctions were appropriate because Appellant violated URCP 
Rule 11, not because of he breached an agreement with Rodgers. As noted above, there 
was no contractual agreement between Rodgers and Fay, only one between Fay and 
Global. 
The first case cited by Appellant, John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 
795 P.2d 678 (Utah App. 1990), is a breach of contract case. Appellant correctly quotes 
what the case said about the purpose of the doctrine of mitigation of damages. However, 
he fails to point out what the court said about who has the burden. Fortunately, Utah law 
is quite clear that "[T]he burden is upon the party whose wrongful act caused the damages 
[in this case, Fay] to prove anything in diminution thereof." Pratt v. Board ofEduc, 564 
P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1977). Since Appellant Fay is the one whose wrongful acts (not 
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just one act, but repeated acts, allegations, suit, and appeal) caused the damages, he has 
the burden of proving anything in diminution thereof. This, he cannot do. 
As set forth above, no matter what evidence Fay had before him prior to filing the 
Complaint (and the evidence he could have obtained had he done even a rudimentary 
investigation) and no matter what evidence came to as the litigation proceeded, Fay 
persisted in his personal war against Todd Rodgers. Notwithstanding an offer to settle 
made three weeks following the filing of the Complaint, (see letter of Scott Nichols, 
supra) he persisted. Notwithstanding all the information that came to him during the 
course of the litigation, he persisted, refusing to alter his position in any way. He has had 
every opportunity imaginable to change his course, yet he has persisted with reckless 
abandon and dogged determination without regards to the duty imposed not to pursue 
parties who are innocent without some justification to believe they may be liable under at 
least some theory of law and fact. 
Fay argues that Mr. Rodgers should have filed a motion following the filing of Fay's 
Complaint. Yet, when Rodgers did file a Motion to Dismiss, Appellant Fay vigorously 
opposed it. Despite acknowledging numerous facts justifying Rodgers' motion to 
dismiss, Fay would not relent. This, too, was a violation of Rule 11. In essence, Fay is 
asking this Court to hold Rodgers responsible for Fay's own ongoing violations of Rule 
11. 
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In support of his mitigation claim, Fay cites Mahmoodv. Ross: 
" "[U]nder the doctrine of avoidable consequences the nonbreaching party has an active 
duty to mitigate his damages . . .," 1999 UT 104, f31, 990 P.2d 933 (Utah 1999). Fay 
apparently "wants to have his cake and eat it too". He spends the majority of his brief 
arguing that the trial court erred in finding him to have breached a duty, which argument, 
if accepted, would make him the nonbreaching party, but then attempts to argue that if the 
trial court was correct in holding him in violation of Rule 11, that Mr. Rodgers suddenly 
has a duty to save Fay himself. Appellant also cites Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380, 
80 P.3d 553 (Utah App. 2003) for the same proposition. The end result, however, is the 
same. 
Unlike the cases Fay cites, this case is not about two parties to a contract, one of 
whom is in breach. Rule 11 cases involve a breach of duty owed to the court. The 
pertinent language is found in Rule 11 (b), which states, 
Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper 
to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney 
or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, 
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
Rule 11 ( c ) (2) speaks to the nature of the sanctions. It says, 
Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall 
be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable 
conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs 
(A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary 
nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and 
warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of 
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some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct 
result of the violation. 
The foregoing language deals with the duty owed to the court, and the court's power 
to fashion sanctions designed to deter repetition of inappropriate representations made to 
the court. The first two sanctions listed, directives of a nonmonetary nature, or payment 
of a penalty into court, have nothing to do with harm caused to the opposing party, and if 
imposed, do nothing to make whole the other party to the litigation. Payment to the other 
party to the litigation may only be ordered if the other party files a molion and the court 
determines that payment to the moving party will have a deterrent effect. The primary 
purpose is to deter inappropriate conduct, not to make the other litigant whole as in a 
breach-of-contract case. The concept of "offset" has no place in a Rule 11 deterrence 
calculation. 
CONCLUSION 
Fay failed to take into proper account what he knew before he filed, and he made no 
objectively reasonable inquiry with respect to the filing of his Complaint or his 
subsequent advocacy before the trial court as to the inclusion of Mr. Todd Rodgers in the 
suit, thus violating Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In his appeal, Fay has 
not met his burden to marshal the evidence—indeed, he has not even tried. Fay has also 
failed to demonstrate any clear error as to the trial court's findings of fact that this Court 
should have to correct. He has not shown that no reasonable person could conclude that 
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awarding Rodgers attorney fees would have a deterrent effect contemplated by Rule 11. 
For any of these reasons, this court should dismiss Appellant's appeal 
When, as shown, Appellant has failed at every point of his appeal, and has 
perpetuated actions that are in violation of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
this Court, as provided in Rule 33 and Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure, 
should also award Rodgers costs and attorney fees for having to defend against a totally 
deficient appeal. Appellee moves this court to do so. 
Respectfully submitted this / day of July, 2009. 
David R. Maddox y^ 
Counsel for Appellee Rodgers 
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